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The impact of solar activity on human technology has been a cause for con-cern ever since the 19th century, when 
the Victorian telegraph system was disrupted 
by a massive geomagnetic storm. Although the 
ferocity of that 1859 event, triggered by a burst 
of solar activity observed by English astronomer 
Richard Carrington, has never been equalled, 
adverse “space weather” poses a risk to modern 
technologies both in space and on the ground. 
The recent disruption to European air traffic 
from the eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull vol-
cano in Iceland served as a stark reminder that 
the everyday technologies on which our modern 
society depend are vulnerable to sudden and 
unexpected natural events. Indeed, many del-
egates at the 2010 National Astronomy Meeting 
in Glasgow, scientists whose daily work focuses 
on understanding the most awesome power-
houses of the universe, were left stranded by a 
natural event that posed no immediate threat 
to their health or safety but was a potentially 
major problem for the jet engines that had 
brought them to the meeting.
In many respects, this disruption arising from 
volcanic activity is analogous to the societal 
threats posed by space weather. The surface of 
the Earth is shielded from virtually all of the 
effects of space weather by our planet’s strong 
magnetic field and dense atmosphere. Even the 
worst space weather disturbances have little or 
no direct impact on life on the surface of the 
Earth. But our advanced society depends upon 
an interlinked infrastructure of high-technology 
systems to deliver vital everyday services, chief 
among which is a reliable electricity generation 
system and distribution grid.
What are the effects?
There is much documented and anecdotal evi-
dence of the effects of extreme space weather 
on the power systems of the developed world. 
Possibly the most frequently cited example of a 
damaging impact is the collapse of the Hydro 
Quebec power system on 13 March 1989. A 
severe geomagnetic storm shut down the com-
plete Quebec high-voltage system in less than 
a minute, with significant knock-on economic 
cost and social disruption (Bolduc 2002). More 
recent storms, for example the October 2003 
“Halloween” magnetic storm (which resulted 
in lower-latitude auroral activity including over 
the UK), are also known to have affected net-
works in Europe, North America, South Africa 
and elsewhere (e.g. Pulkkinen et al. 2005, 
Gaunt and Coetzee 2007, Thomson et al. 2005). 
Meanwhile, a recent study by the US National 
Research Council (2008) into the present-day 
economic impact of a repeat of the “Carrington 
Storm” of September 1859, has estimated the 
cost at $1–2 trillion in the US alone in the first 
year after the storm, with full recovery taking 
between four and ten years, depending upon the 
level of damage to infrastructure.
It is well known that the impact of a coronal 
mass ejection (CME) on the Earth’s protective 
magnetosphere can lead to a geomagnetic storm, 
dramatically boosting existing electrical cur-
rents in the magnetosphere. These current sys-
tems cause large magnetic variations, inducing 
electric fields in the solid Earth that, in turn, gen-
erate geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) 
in conducting pipes and wires. Once flowing 
through a power network, GICs are unwanted 
quasi-direct currents, superimposed on the 
alternating currents within the grid, unbalanc-
ing and damaging critical transformers.
Power grids at all latitudes, not only those in 
polar regions, are at risk from the natural haz-
ard of GICs (figure 1). However, after entering 
a conducting network via grounding points, the 
different pathways taken by GICs are influenced 
by the electrical properties of each network. 
As such, the study of GIC impact on national 
power grids incorporates aspects of geophys-
ics, solar physics, solar–terrestrial physics and 
power engineering. There is therefore consider-
able scope for cross-disciplinary engagement 
between solar-, space- and geophysicists and the 
power engineering community, to turn scien-
tific understanding into practical tools for risk 
assessment and hazard mitigation.
GIC workshop
In order to further this engagement, the Uni-
versity of Cape Town and the Hermanus Mag-
netic Observatory hosted a workshop in South 
Africa in December 2008 for a group of UK 
and South African scientists with GIC exper-
tise. This workshop was funded by the Royal 
Society on behalf of the UK government, and 
by the National Research Foundation on behalf 
of the government of South Africa. One aim 
of the GIC workshop was the free exchange of 
ideas, insights and knowledge about the natu-
ral geomagnetic hazard and GIC risk in both 
developed and developing countries. A second 
aim of the workshop was to summarize the sci-
entific and engineering “state of play” for the 
power engineering industry, for the public and 
for policy makers (Thomson et al. 2010). The 
workshop participants therefore compiled a 
short list of major points that they believed with 
some confidence that scientists and engineers 
do know about the GIC risk to electric power 
systems, as well as major things we still do not 
know (see page 5.24).
Compared with the “do knows” in our list, our 
“don’t knows” may be more contentious within 
the scientific community. It may be debated 
which items are most important at present, 
while at the same time understanding that other 
issues might yet become more relevant. How-
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1: Failure in a large South African generator 
transformer, three weeks after the 
Halloween storm of 2003. The disruption of 
the winding and insulation by the arcing fault 
at the time of final failure is clear. The arcing 
fault also destroys evidence that might lead 
to a better understanding of the progression 
of damage after initiation by the geomagnetic 
current event. (From Thompson et al. 2010)
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ever, by making progress on our “don’t knows” 
we expect advances in the community’s ability 
to monitor, model and predict the impacts of 
space weather and GICs on power grids.
Solar cycle 24 is just beginning and we can 
expect that the space-weather hazard to ground-
based technologies will increase, just as it did 
during the up-turn of previous cycles. Wider 
discussion of these issues is required, not just 
within the international space-weather commu-
nity, but also within industry and society. ●
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1. What are the solar and interplanetary 
events and signatures that are most 
“geoeffective” in terms of GIC causation? 
2. What characteristics of extreme 
geomagnetic storms pose the highest risk?
3. In predicting GICs, what is the 
contribution of each of the different 
components of the geomagnetic field and 
other parameters such as the ionospheric 
total electron content and the interplanetary 
magnetic field (e.g. Pulkkinen et al. 2006)?
4. What are the definitive spatial/temporal 
scales of the magnetospheric and ionospheric 
currents that drive significant GICs in grids?
5. What is an adequate number/distribution 
of magnetometers to model GICs?
6. Which information, given on what 
timescale, is most useful for any given power 
utility/authority to manage its GIC risk?
7. In modelling GICs in a power grid, 
what level of detail is required of Earth 
conductivity (as a 3-D model or otherwise)?
8. What are the characteristics of power 
transformers that determine their 
susceptibility to GICs and therefore 
determine the extent of damage sustained 
under different levels of GICs?
9. What are the transformer failure 
mechanisms after damage initiated by GICs?
10. Where should scientists go to access 
industry archives, particularly archives of 
GIC measurements obtained concurrently 
with network data (i.e. network configuration 
and connections, DC resistances of 
transmission lines and transformers and 
station earthing resistances)?
1. Solar storms (i.e. CMEs) that lead to high 
levels of GICs are statistically more likely 
during periods close to solar maximum and 
in the descending phase of the solar cycle, but 
they do also occur at all other times in the 
solar activity cycle.
2. The magnetospheric and ionospheric 
currents that drive GICs are different at 
different latitudes.
3. The dominant cause of GICs in power 
grids is the temporal rate of change of the 
Earth’s magnetic field.
4. Interpolating the magnetic field 
from spatially distributed geomagnetic 
observations improves the prediction 
accuracy of GICs at any given point, even at 
mid-latitudes (e.g. Bernhardi et al. 2008). 
This is in comparison with predictions 
made from data from a single magnetic 
observatory, taken to be representative of the 
“regional” situation.
5. GICs are larger in countries and regions 
where the geology is generally more resistive 
(discussed, for example, in Pirjola and 
Viljanen 1991).
6. A multi-layered and laterally varying 
ground conductivity model gives better 
prediction of GICs than the simpler 
assumption of a homogeneous Earth (e.g. 
Ngwira et al. 2008, Thomson et al. 2005).
7. GICs have been demonstrated to affect 
power systems at all latitudes.
8. GICs can affect many power transformers 
simultaneously at multiple points across 
regional- and continental-scale networks.
9. Series capacitors in transmission lines 
may interrupt GIC flow in power networks, 
but are expensive. Some strategies involving 
capacitors may increase GIC and reactive 
power demands (e.g. Erinmez et al. 2002).
10. It is possible from transformer dissolved 
gas analysis to identify GIC-initiated damage 
before complete transformer failure occurs. 
This is especially true if the rate of gassing 
increases in widely separated transformers 
across a network (figure 2).
Known knowns: 10 things we know about GICs
2: Results of dissolved gas 
analysis for a transformer 
in South Africa during the 
geomagnetically active 
period in late 2003, also 
showing intervals of kP 6 and 
7 level geomagnetic activity. 
This shows continued gas 
generation throughout 
the period. The ratios of 
different gases indicate low 
temperature degradation 
of paper insulation (which 
ultimately led to the 
transformer being removed 
from service). Similar 
trends were observed at several other sites across the South African grid throughout this period, 
suggesting that the damage was caused by a nationwide factor. (From Thompson et al. 2010)
Known unknowns: 10 things we don’t know about GICs
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